Simply putting a capital letter on a word does not, by itself, confer ontological dignity. Typography cannot do the work of metaphysics.
The difficulty with this essay is the abrupt pivot it makes. We begin with an apparently modest definition of consciousness as awareness of experience. But within a few sentences the author has slid, almost imperceptibly, into far bolder claims:
• “Consciousness is the only thing we can be certain of.”
• “Consciousness defines matter and makes it real through experience.”
Thus we move from the uncontroversial “consciousness = experience” to the rather more ambitious “Consciousness = the foundation of reality.” The manoeuvre is executed without fanfare, as though no leap had been made at all.
But it is a leap, and a non sequitur at that. The fact that all knowledge passes through consciousness (an epistemological observation) does not entail that consciousness constitutes the ground of being itself (an ontological claim). These are not two versions of the same thing, but two quite distinct orders of analysis.
To establish the ontological primacy of consciousness would require additional premises and arguments. As it stands, the argument relies less on reasoning than on typography: a capital letter here, a subtle semantic shift there. Rhetoric is doing the work that philosophy should be doing.
PS. Despite this critique, I share the author’s instinct that Consciousness may indeed carry ontological weight in relation to matter. To avoid endless equivocation, however, one might adopt a simple convention: consciousness (small c) for immediate experience, and Consciousness (capital C) for ontology. A typographical device, yes—but one that, if explicitly defined, could at least provide a minimal taxonomy and prevent rhetoric from masquerading as argument.
Simply putting a capital letter on a word does not, by itself, confer ontological dignity. Typography cannot do the work of metaphysics.
The difficulty with this essay is the abrupt pivot it makes. We begin with an apparently modest definition of consciousness as awareness of experience. But within a few sentences the author has slid, almost imperceptibly, into far bolder claims:
• “Consciousness is the only thing we can be certain of.”
• “Consciousness defines matter and makes it real through experience.”
Thus we move from the uncontroversial “consciousness = experience” to the rather more ambitious “Consciousness = the foundation of reality.” The manoeuvre is executed without fanfare, as though no leap had been made at all.
But it is a leap, and a non sequitur at that. The fact that all knowledge passes through consciousness (an epistemological observation) does not entail that consciousness constitutes the ground of being itself (an ontological claim). These are not two versions of the same thing, but two quite distinct orders of analysis.
To establish the ontological primacy of consciousness would require additional premises and arguments. As it stands, the argument relies less on reasoning than on typography: a capital letter here, a subtle semantic shift there. Rhetoric is doing the work that philosophy should be doing.
PS. Despite this critique, I share the author’s instinct that Consciousness may indeed carry ontological weight in relation to matter. To avoid endless equivocation, however, one might adopt a simple convention: consciousness (small c) for immediate experience, and Consciousness (capital C) for ontology. A typographical device, yes—but one that, if explicitly defined, could at least provide a minimal taxonomy and prevent rhetoric from masquerading as argument.